A model is developed in which an industry of N $ 1 firms is privatised. The 'participation' method of privatisation is used, whereby firms are sold for cash, but the state retains a proportionate share of ownership. In each firm the new private owner has the opportunity to make a reorganisational investment, before output is produced. This investment is unobservable by the state, and therefore non-contractible. There is Cournot competition in the product market. The welfare-maximising retained ownership share for the state is analysed, taking into account that potential buyers of firms may have limited access to finance.
Introduction
In the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union privatisation has taken place by a variety of methods (see, for example, Estrin, 1994; Brada, 1996) . Following the lead of the Czech Republic and Russia, the most common method (used or proposed) has been voucher, or mass, privatisation. However, Germany, Hungary and Estonia have relied heavily on privatisation by sale, with foreign investors playing a major role in the latter two countries. Moreover, from 1995 onwards the Czech and Slovak Republics, Russia and several other countries switched emphasis to privatisation by sale (EBRD, 1996b) . In many of these privatisations the state has kept a significant share in the ownership of firms, while giving up all managerial control (see Perotti, 1995 , on the Hungarian case). This 'participation' model of sale, which is the subject of the present paper, has been forcefully advocated by Sinn and Sinn (1993) and Bolton and Roland (1992) . It has also been analysed formally by Demougin and Sinn (1994) , on whose work we build. In this model, privatisation is undertaken with two objectives in mind: to bring about investment in the modernisation of firms 1 and to generate revenue for the state. The investment is required because of decades of poor technological and organisational achievement under Communism, while state revenue is a critical factor largely because profit tax revenue has collapsed at the same time as some spending needs (for example, for the provision 2 of a social safety net) have risen substantially.
Unlike Demougin and Sinn, who focus on risk-sharing, we do not allow for uncertainty. This simplification allows us to introduce several other considerations into the analysis. First, in previous theoretical work it does not seem to have been taken into account that the firms being sold may compete against one another in the product market. Yet, both the amount that a buyer is willing to pay for a firm and the willingness of the buyer then to invest in the reorganisation of the firm will depend on how competitive the product market is. In our model this is recognized by supposing that an industry of N firms is being privatised, where N $ 1. The buyer of each firm is assumed to make an investment in its reorganisation before production takes place, after which firms play a Cournot production game.
Second, we assume that investment by the new private owner of a firm involves the allocation of resources in a way that may be unobservable and non-contractible. In contrast, Demougin and Sinn assume for most of their analysis that there is contractibility, with the amount of investment the buyer will make specified in the contract when the firm is bought. This corresponds to the investment targets that were set for buyers of German SOEs and which have more recently been specified in Estonia and the Slovak Republic (EBRD, 1996b) . However, as Demougin and Sinn point out, a government will be unable to observe the real cost to a company of transferring managerial know-how to an acquired firm, for this depends on the managers' alternative occupations. In our model the amount of investment is chosen freely by the buyer and may not be observable to outsiders. Hence, we 1 A major economic objective of privatisation that we do not consider is change in corporate governance and / or managerial motivation. Also, we ignore political objectives such as to make the reform process irreversible. See Estrin (1994) and Dewatripont and Roland (1996) .
2 See Blanchard (1994) and Coricelli (1996) . EBRD (1997) reports a negative general government balance in 1996 for 27 of 28 transition economies it covers. 3 suppose that the full cost of investment is borne by the buyer. The government's participation in the firm relates only to the share it takes of production profit (the government is a sleeping partner). This participation may be interpreted as ownership or as a cash-flow tax. A cash flow-tax may be less open to abuse than a 4 profit tax would be.
Third, we investigate two different forms of reorganisational investment. One form updates methods, reducing marginal cost for a good that is already in production. The other form creates capacity to produce a new output, for example, as Volkswagen has created capacity in Skoda to produce cars of, for Skoda, a previously unachieved quality. For the latter form of investment we also allow for the possibility that the good is internationally traded, with producers facing a horizontal demand curve.
Fourth, we allow for the possibility that any potential buyer of a firm may be financially constrained. This is to reflect the fact that in transition economies the main source of investment funds, domestic savings, has declined sharply in real terms, while the fragility of the banking sector undermines savings mobilisation and financial intermediation. Although there has been a recent increase in sales of firms to foreign companies, this has been concentrated in a few of the transition economies and in particular market segments (EBRD, 1996b) . Furthermore, 5 foreign companies also have limits on the funds they have available. In our model the finance constraint plays two potential roles. It may prevent a buyer from paying the amount the firm is worth; and given the amount it pays for the firm, the buyer may have insufficient access to funds to raise the amount of reorganisation investment to the profit-maximising level.
We begin our analysis by formulating a 'basic model' in which there is no binding constraint on finance. Given that the industry faces a downward-sloping demand curve, then, if government revenue is given a large enough weight in the welfare function, the optimum retained ownership share for the state tends to be larger when there are more firms in the industry being privatised. This conclusion is unaffected by whether reorganisational investment occurs as cost reduction or capacity expansion. However, for the latter case, we also allow for the effect of international trade through the alternative assumption that the goods demand curve is horizontal. Then, we find that, provided the industry is commercially viable, the state should not keep any share in ownership. When we introduce a binding limit on finance into the model, we find that, generally speaking, the more finance is limited, the greater is the share in ownership that the state should keep. Also, for the case of investment in capacity expansion we describe a possible situation in which a limit on finance leads to the non-existence of an equilibrium price for a firm.
Since we assume throughout that any retained ownership in a firm by the state is in the form of non-voting shares, the government cannot control a firm's behaviour directly. Nonetheless, the government can influence a firm's behaviour through its choice of how big an ownership share to keep. The underlying feature of the model that generates our main results is the tendency, when finance is unlimited, of Cournot competitors to overinvest relative to the collusive profit-maximising solution. When, however, the government takes a share of production profit, the incentive to invest is less for the private owner, ceteris paribus. This can raise production profit for the industry and revenue for the government (from its ownership share, if any, plus the price it is able to get for the share it sells). The government should take an ownership share if it values revenue sufficiently greatly, compared with investment (or consumer surplus). If a limit on finance for firms prevents such a solution from being attained, the optimal government ownership share tends to be yet higher because this causes the price that a private buyer is willing to pay for its share of a firm to be lower. The private buyer is therefore left with a larger proportion of its financial resources to use for investment, limiting the fall of investment below the level in the financeunconstrained solution.
If there were no binding constraints on the availability of finance or on the value that the private ownership share could take, a first-best solution would always be achieved. However, when such constraints bind we enter a second-best world. A constraint that we impose throughout is that the private ownership share cannot exceed unity, i.e. the state will not subsidise production profit. This constraint binds when the government values investment greatly compared to revenue. Another potentially binding constraint, the effects of which we note in the final section, is that for 'privatisation' to take place the private ownership share may have to be at least one-half.
Before proceeding, it is worth considering the possible empirical relevance of the potential for overinvestment when oligopolies are privatised, though we can only draw indirect inferences. First, note that, according to EBRD (1995) , the ratio of gross fixed investment to GDP for 1993-1994 was 'fairly high' in many transition economies, compared to the OECD average (for 1994) of 20.6%. For example, for the Czech and Slovak Republics, Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Belarus and Russia the ratio was in the range 20-28%. And EBRD (1996a) reports that the ratio of investment to GDP tended to rise from 1994 6 onwards outside the CIS. It should also be emphasized that much investment is in 6 EBRD (1996a) does not specify which concept of investment it is considering.
forms that are not recorded in official statistics. For example, as we have already mentioned, there is an opportunity cost to transferring managerial resources from 7 the other activities of a company. This may be especially important for foreign investors. Second, we may focus on Hungary and Estonia, since, apart from the special case of Germany, these are the main exponents of privatisation by direct sale. Duponcel (1998) reports that in the Hungarian and Estonian food sectors foreign direct investment has considerably increased competition, while EBRD (1997) notes that in Estonia the contractual investment obligations specified by the government when selling firms have often been exceeded, sometimes by a wide margin. Though such evidence is only circumstantial, it is consistent with the hypothesis that investment in some industries may be greater than the amount that would maximise government revenue.
We begin our analysis by examining the 'basic' case, in which finance is unconstrained. The model is set up for this case in Section 2 and solved in Section 3. Then, in Section 4, we introduce a shortage of finance. Section 5 concludes by discussing the implications of changing our set of assumptions. Appendix A provides proofs of propositions and deals with the technical points.
The basic model
There are N $ 1 firms in an industry producing a homogeneous good. All the firms are state-owned; there is no production of the good by the de novo sector and no foreign trade in the good. The firms may have been subject to some limited 8 restructuring. They are simultaneously sold into the private sector, where the 9 number of potential buyers is large relative to N. The timing of the model is as follows.
• Decision Stage: The government specifies the share 1 2 s that it will take from 7 Also, particularly in the case of Russia a significant proportion of investment is 'informal' (Linz and Krueger, 1998) or 'relational' (Gaddy and Ickes, 1998 ) and so does not show up in data.
8 Grosfeld and Roland (1995) distinguish 'defensive' restructuring, which is restricted to labourshedding and downsizing activities, from 'strategic' restructuring, which involves thoughtful business projects and modernisation investments. In practice SOEs have engaged primarily in defensive restructuring. The reorganisation investment that occurs after privatisation in our model may be regarded as strategic. 9 We assume throughout that N is exogenously given. If, instead, N is treated as a choice variable, the obvious results are obtained that government revenue is decreasing in N, while consumer surplus is increasing in N. Another issue that might be examined is that of whether a buyer would wish to purchase more than one firm in the industry. Our results are correct for the case in which each buyer purchases just one firm. If multiple purchases are allowed some modification of our analysis is necessary, depending on the particular assumptions made, but the general flavour of our results survives. However, an adequate treatment of this problem raises questions that are beyond the scope of the present paper, such as what form the auction of firms should take. the profits earned by the firms in the production stage.
• Sales Stage: The government then sells each firm for a cash price P and a share 10 1 2 s. Given s, competitive bidding for each firm determines P.
• Investment Stage: The buyer of any firm j then invests a non-negative amount i j ( j 5 1,2, . . . ,N).
• Production Stage: Finally, the firms play a Cournot production game. Each firm j produces output q . j Once the firms are sold, the state takes no part in investment or production decisions. Investment is likely to be multi-dimensional, making the writing of a complete contract extremely costly and difficult to enforce. We therefore assume that investment by the new private owner (for short, 'the owner') is noncontractible. Nonetheless, the government can affect investment through its choice 11 of s. We restrict this choice to the range s [ (0,1], though for analytical purposes we shall also consider values of s outside this range.
We shall henceforth omit firm subscripts, because we shall be considering only 12 symmetric equilibria. At the production stage the industry faces the demand curve:
where p is the unit price of the good and A and b are constants. Firms play a Cournot game at this stage, with each one generating a gross production profit P. The characterization of this game depends on the form that the reorganisation investment takes. We shall return to this below. 10 We do not allow for discounting and we assume that no output is produced until the production stage. These simplifications do not have significant qualitative effects on the results.
11 Suppose 1 2 s is an ownership share (not a tax rate). An objection that might then be made to our formulation is that the new private owner of the firm could dilute the government's share, ex post, by issuing further shares, thereby making meaningless the government's 'optimum' choice of s. However, if the private owner behaved in this way, the government could respond by imposing a profit tax that restores the share of profit it receives to the optimum level. By the same token, it might be objected that the government could in any case impose a profit tax, ex post (after privatisation) of any size, so that the choice of the value of s analysed in this paper is of no significance. However, the government might wish to avoid such behaviour because it would send an adverse signal to potential buyers of firms in other industries yet to be privatised, thereby damaging the government's future revenue prospects. We disregard such complications and assume that s is fixed once-and-for-all at the decision stage.
12 It is shown by Salant and Shaffer (1999) that in models where prior actions can affect subsequent marginal costs in Cournot equilibrium (e.g. in research joint ventures), social optima may be asymmetric. Allowance for asymmetric equilibria in our model would lead to the result that when investment is in cost reduction, if the government wants to maximise its own revenue it should close down all firms except one in the industry before privatisation. However, in transition economies governments have generally avoided trying to 'pick winners' in this way, preferring to let market performance after privatisation determine which firms succeed and which fail.
Denote the net profit accruing to the owner of a firm, for the investment and production stages combined, by:
For any given level of i by a firm, the resulting level of its p depends on the amount of investment by other firms. Given s, the owner of each firm chooses i to maximise p, treating investment by other firms as constant. Denote the firm's investment in the resulting Nash equilibrium by i*(s) and the corresponding value of p by p*(s). Competition between the potential buyers forces the price P paid for a firm up to the level at which it squeezes out all rent for the new owner:
Going back to the decision stage, the government chooses s optimally, taking into account behaviour in the three succeeding stages. It wishes to maximise the concave welfare function:
where government revenue R is given by:
and CS is consumer surplus, which, using (1), is given by:
Since CS is increasing in i in the model, (4) is equivalent to w 5 W(R, i). We do not include profit as a separate argument of W because, in the solution to the model, p accrues to the government as the price P paid for the firm and so is already taken into account through the appearance of R in (4).
Finally, we distinguish two cases, corresponding to the two forms that reorganisational investment may take. First, suppose investment is in cost reduction (Case CR). In this case, we assume that, given the amount of investment i by a firm, it has a constant unit cost of goods production c, where:
e write C(0) ; C and assume that A . C . 0. Given i, the equilibrium of the ensuing Cournot production game yields:
Alternatively, investment may be in capacity expansion (Case CE):
where q is a firm's output capacity. We assume that in this case unit cost c is constant and the same for all firms (c , A). In the solution, each firm will only install capacity that will be fully used in the production stage. Analytically, the investment and production stages therefore collapse into one stage. For each firm:
In the Nash equilibrium each firm sets i 5 i*(s) to maximise (2) subject to (10). As a subcase, we can accommodate the assumption of free international trade in the good at the given unit price by supposing that b 5 0. Then, from (1) and (10) First, we assume that there is no limit on the availability of finance F and that investment is in cost reduction. Taking into account that production will be a Cournot game, as represented by Eq. (8), we begin by considering the investment stage. Here, we can disregard the price P paid for the firm because this is a by-gone. In the Nash equilibrium, with i chosen to maximise p, as defined by (2), the f.o.c. for an internal solution is:
We assume throughout that for all i $ 0
This ensures that d p /di , 0, so that the p-maximum is unique. Firms will invest if the private ownership parameter s is sufficiently large. It is shown in Appendix A that i* . 0 if s . s , where:
If, however, s # s , firms set i* 5 0. From (11) it is found that:
Thus, if the share of production profit P going to the owner of the firm is large 13 If we were to suppose that b 5 0 in Case CR we would find that firms would wish to produce infinite amounts. We therefore only consider b 5 0 for Case CE. enough to induce positive investment, a higher share induces more investment. Also, note from (11) that i* is decreasing in N for s . s . 0 We now go back to the decision stage. In choosing s the government takes into account what will happen in the three succeeding stages. We assume first that the government chooses s to maximise revenue.
Proposition 1. When investment is in cost reduction, revenue R is maximized bỹ setting s 5 s :
When s , 1/N there is positive investment in the solution. The government 0 chooses s so as indirectly to control investment. If the industry is a monopoly the government should not take any share of production profit (1 2 s 5 0). Rather, it should extract the largest possible price for the firm. With a duopoly, the government should take a 50% share, while for an industry with three or more firms it should take a majority share. Conclusions are different, however, if s $ 1/N, in which case the government sets s at a level that ensures that the 0 owner makes no investment. Intuitively, part (i) of the proposition can be justified as follows. At the investment stage a firm chooses i to maximise p 5 sP 2 i. If the government were choosing i for the firm it would do so to maximise R, which, using (2), (3) and (5), reduces to the maximisation of N(P 2 i). When N 5 1, the maximisation problems of the firm and government can therefore be made equivalent by setting s 5 1. When N 5 2, if the government were to set s 5 1, competition between the firms would cause them to invest (and produce) in excess of the collusive equilibrium (i.e. in excess of the first-best solution). The government can cause the collusive equilibrium to be achieved, however, by reducing s below 1 (specifically to s 5 1 / 2). This result comes about because competition between firms is, in production costs if all the investment were made in a single firm. only occur if N $ 2). In this case, although 100% private ownership would result in positive investment, the government prefers to take an ownership share, restricting s to no more than s in order to ensure that the private owner is not 0 willing to invest. Intuitively, similar reasoning applies to that given with respect to part (i) of the proposition. If government were to set s 5 1 firms would invest competitively in excess of the collusive equilibrium. But the industry's prospects are so poor that the collusive equilibrium is i 5 0. By setting s # s the 0 government achieves the first-best. Proposition 1 is illustrated diagrammatically in Fig. 1 . In each panel of Fig. 1 PC denotes the 'participation constraint', which is the locus of (s, P)-combinations such that (3) is satisfied. For any given s, we denote the corresponding P that exactly satisfies this constraint by P(s). Above (below) PC, P . , p. Also using s d (2), (8) and (11), the slope of PC is: dependence of i* on s introduces curvature into PC. Iso-revenue loci are illustrated in the figure by the dashed lines. These are found from (5), (8) and (11), and have slope:
When N 5 1, the curved segment of PC has positive slope; but, for N $ 2, the slope cannot generally be signed. This is because the slope depends on a combination of two factors. First, as shown by the first term on the r.h.s. of (15), the direct effect of an increase in s, holding i constant, is for p to rise, as therefore does P(s). Second, however, as shown by the second term on the r.h.s. of (15), the 'indirect' effect of a higher s is that investment rises, and this reduces p, lowering P(s). For any s, given that N $ 2, competitive investment by each firm reduces p below the maximum that could be achieved through collusive investment. The yet higher investment resulting from a higher s has a further negative effect on p, and so on P(s). For the curved segment of PC to increase in slope as s rises, it is sufficient that C-. 0. However, Proposition 1 holds independently of this condition. For any s, competition between potential buyers will always bid P up such that the solution is on PC. Comparing (15) and (16) 16 If the government prefers revenue earlier rather than later, revenue via P is preferable to revenue via 1 2 s. However, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that out of the multiple solutions shown in panel (ii), s is the best. Once we take into account time preference for the government we 0 should also take into account time preference for the potential buyers of the firm. This affects the price they are willing to pay and complicates the results considerably. 17 We note in Appendix A how Fig. 1 is easily amended to illustrate Proposition 2, with iso-welfare curves WW replacing iso-revenue curves RR. The tangency of an WW curve with PC indicates the first-best value of s. However, if the weight on CS in the welfare function is relatively large, this tangency may occur at s . 1, iñ which case the solution s 5 1 is second-best.
Finally, notice that in some cases the optimum value of s does not depend on the cost function, so the government does not need ex ante information on this function. This occurs with a general welfare function if N 5 1, with a linear welfare function W 5 R 1 CS if N 5 1 or 2 and with either W 5 R or W 5 CS for any N. Nonetheless, in all cases bidders need to know the cost function ex ante.
Investment in capacity expansion (CE)
We deal more briefly with Case CE (again with F unlimited) because the analysis is similar to that for Case CR. In Case CE unit costs at the production stage are fixed at c for all firms. Investment i is in capacity expansion, with output always set at the capacity level: q 5 Q(i). The investment and production stages are, in effect, combined, yielding a Nash equilibrium i 5 i* in which i is chosen to maximise p, subject to (10) and given the value of s. For an internal solution the f.o.c. is:
It is shown in Appendix A that A 2 c 2 (N 1 1)bQ(i*) . 0 in this solution, and also that for i* . 0 it is necessary that s . s , where:
0 If s # s , then i* 5 0 and so there is no output. This can happen as a result of a 0 combination of one or more of: a small ownership share s, a small markup A 2 c and an investment function Q(i) for which the first unit of investment has a relatively low productivity. From (17): above s (though it must also be taken into account that s cannot exceed 1).
Proposition 4. When investment is in capacity expansion, welfare W(R,CS) is maximized by setting s 5 s :
W CS ]] A 2 c 2 NbQ i*(s ) 22 f gS D W R ]]]]]]]]] (i) s 5 min5 ,1 6i f s , 1; 0 A 2 c 2 (N 1 1)bQ i*(s ) f g (ii) s [ [0, 1], if s $ 1.
R
Interestingly, if we take the illustrative welfare function W 5 R 1 CS, we find that s 5 1 for all N. The weight put on CS in this welfare function, and the associated tendency to raise s to the maximum value, outweighs the tendency, if N $ 2, to reduce s below 1 for revenue purposes. However, the urgency with which revenue is generally required in transition economies may make this particular welfare function unrealistic. For the special case of b 5 0, with unlimited international trade at price p 5 A,P ropositions 3 and 4 yield s 5 s 5 1: regardless of the value of N and of whether R CS is included in the welfare function, the government should surrender all ownership. With a constant output price there is no strategic interaction between firms, so that, in choosing s, the government can consider each firm separately. The argument for restricting s below 1 to limit revenue-damaging competition no longer applies.
Finally, note that, for Case CE in general, the government does not need to know the function Q(i) if any of the following hold: N 5 1, W 5 R 1 CS and b 5 0. Under any of these circumstances, it should set s 5 1. Otherwise, however, knowledge of Q(i) is required by the government to set s appropriately.
Contractibility of investment
We now suppose, either for Case CR or Case CE, that the private owner's investment is observable to the government and is therefore contractible. It therefore becomes feasible for the government to bear a share of (or to subsidise) investment costs. Given, however, that there is no limit on finance, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 5. Even if investment is contractible, to maximise revenue R the government should not share in the cost of investment.
Note that the bearing of some of the cost of investment by the government cannot be ruled out on the grounds that it involves a direct cut in revenue R, for, ceteris paribus, it also results in the government receiving a higher price P for the firm. Rather, the rationale for this proposition is that, even without bearing any of the investment cost, the government is able to manipulate s to achieve a first-best solution. It is therefore unnecessary to use other policy instruments. In particular, suppose Eq. (2) is replaced by the more general equation:
where s is an additional government policy tool, a parameter for the firm. Proposition 5 implies that there is no advantage in making s other than unity.
Notice that, among other things, this argument implies that, in general, the government should not set s 5 s. If it did so, we would have p 5 s P 2 i , with s d the government taking a share s of overall profit p (rather than sharing only in production profit P, as it does when s 5 1). In this case, maximisation of p by the private owner yields a value of i* that is independent of s, so that the government loses all leverage over investment. As with any value of s other than unity, R may therefore be lower, and is never higher, than when s 5 1.
When consumer surplus CS is included in the welfare function a parallel to Proposition 5 does not hold unless the further restriction is made that s $ 1, i.e. unless subsidisation of investment is precluded. To see why this statement is true, note that in the analysis of Sections 3.1 and 3.2, if the weight the government puts on CS is sufficiently large, compared to that it puts on R, the solution s 5 1 is not a first-best. A first-best could be achieved by setting s . 1, but this is ruled out by assumption. However, when investment is contractible, with Eq. (29) being used, investment becomes a function of s /s, rather than just s. While retaining the constraint that s # 1, the possibility now arises of raising s /s above unity by setting s , 1, and thereby achieving the first-best solution. Thus, if we assume that subsidisation of investment (s , 1) is politically feasible, but subsidisation of production profit (s . 1) is not, it is desirable in this case that investment be contractible. Alternatively, if the restriction s $ 1 is imposed, Proposition 5 generalises to the welfare function w 5 W(R, CS).
Constrained finance
In the model of Sections 2 and 3 the new owner of a firm makes 'up-front' payments P 1 i, only receiving a return at the production stage. However, transition economies suffer from severe imperfections in capital markets and sometimes from a general shortage of means of payment. It is therefore of interest to examine how the working of the model is affected if potential bidders for a firm have limited access to finance. To keep our analysis brief, we shall make the simplifying assumption that all potential bidders have the same amount of finance 19 F available. If bidders have formed coalitions, pooling their financial resources, this can be regarded as already reflected in the value of F.
The modifications that must be made to our previous analysis are illustrated in Fig. 2 for Case CR (we shall return to Case CE below). The first modification is that price P cannot exceed F. This is represented in the figure by the 'finance constraint' (FC): 
Secondly, we introduce the 'unconstrained investment boundary' (UIB), which is given by:
This is the locus of (s, P)-combinations for which, given any P, the investment level i*(s), as represented by (11) (14) and (21) that UIB is 0 downward-sloping. At (s,P)-combinations above UIB but below PC, the owner of the firm would like to set i 5 i*(s), but has only F 2 P , i*(s) available to spend. In this case i 5 F 2 P. At (s, P)-combinations on or below UIB, i 5 i*(s). The participation constraint PC from Fig. 1 is also shown, with the value of s at which it intersects UIB denoted by s . Panels (i) and (ii) (3) and (8), the slope of PC9 where PC9 ± PC is found to be:
For any s, competitive bidding for firms will now lead to the attainment of a point 21 on whichever is the lower of PC9 and FC in the figure.
We can now generalize Proposition 1.
Proposition 6. When investment is in cost reduction and there is a limit on finance

9
F for each bidder, revenue R is maximized by setting s 5 s where:
If F is sufficiently large, there is no change from the solution described in 20 We assume for simplicity that in the production stage, when variable costs Cq are incurred, a firm pays its bills after sales revenue is received. The rationale for this assumption is as follows. First, the production stage may be regarded as implicitly representing an indefinitely repeated game, with a stream of payments into and out of the firm over time. Thus, out of the cost Cq incurred in the production stage, only a small proportion is payable before revenue is received. To treat this small proportion of Cq as pre-paid in the model would add complications without affecting results significantly. Second, insofar as there is trade credit or wage arrears, the pre-paid portion of Cq would be yet smaller. 21 In general, we cannot say whether, for s . s , PC9 is above or below PC. This is because, for 1 N $ 2, if investment is unconstrained, firms over-invest relative to the collusive equilibrium. In general, for a given s . s , a constraint on finance that limits investment to some extent may therefore cause p 1 (so also P) to rise; in this case PC9 is above PC. Alternatively, a tighter finance constraint may reduce investment to such an extent that p is lower than it would be in the absence of a constraint; in this case PC9 is below PC. If N 5 1, however, PC9 is always below PC because the firm never over-invests.
Proposition 1. This solution appears as part (c) of Proposition 6. However, parts (a) and (b) of Proposition 6 relate to a value of F small enough to prevent Proposition 1 from applying, in which case the solution is definitely second-best. To illustrate these cases, panels (i) and (ii) of Fig. 2 replicate the corresponding panels of Fig.  1 , with the limit on finance added. s , the level of s at which UIB intersects PC, 1 now plays a critical role. Fig. 2(i) illustrates part (b) of Proposition 6. Here, although s exceeds s , it is less than s , the revenue-maximising value of s from 1 0 R Fig. 1(i) . The solution depicted in Fig. 1(i) therefore cannot be achieved. Proposition 6 part (b) says that the government should set s 5 s in this case, so 1 that P 5 P(s ). In effect, the solution here involves getting as close as possible to 1s ,P(s ) , the solution in Fig. 1(i) , while still remaining on PC. Intuitively, in (i), by setting s 5 s , the government obtains a particular combination of R immediate rewards (through P) and later rewards (through 1 2 s). But the introduction of the binding limit on a private owner's ability to make up-front payments, P 1 i, as in Fig. 2(i) , causes the government to switch the emphasis from its own immediate rewards to later ones, in the sense that it raises its ownership share 1 2 s. Finally, part (a) of Proposition 6 is depicted in Fig. 2 (ii). As in part (ii) of Proposition 1, there are multiple solutions for s along PC9 5 PC, but the finance constraint imposes a limit F on the price P that can be paid. The range of multiple solutions is therefore more restricted than in Proposition 1. It is now a simple matter to allow for CS in the welfare function.
Proposition 7. When investment is in cost reduction and there is a limit on finance F for each bidder, welfare W(R, CS) is maximized by setting:
This proposition states that if there is a binding limit on finance then the 9 solution s 5 s , which maximises R, also maximises W(R, CS); otherwise, F does R not affect the solution, which is therefore given by Proposition 2. Take, for example, the situation depicted in Fig. 2(i) . We already know that R-maximisation is achieved by setting s 5 s , but consider how CS is affected by variation of s. In Case CE Fig. 2 again applies except that the straight-line section of PC must be deleted in each panel. This has a significant effect on the solution in panel (ii), in which case privatisation does not occur. For s # s there are no bidders for 0 firms. For s . s competitive bidding pushes P towards F, but as P approaches F 0 the new owner of a firm has no finance left to invest in capacity and so a firm is not worth buying, i.e. an equilibrium value of P does not exist. Setting b 5 0, so that there is unlimited international trade at price P, does not affect the validity of Proposition 8.
Broadly speaking, we have therefore found in this section, for both cases, CR and CE, that a binding limit on finance tends to reduce the share of ownership that the government should keep. Suppose, for example, that an industry is sold off to foreign buyers, perhaps because it requires particular reorganisational skills that are not available domestically. If the foreign buyers have a relatively large amount of finance available, then the state ownership share in this industry should be kept relatively low. However, we are disregarding here the political tensions that may 23 accompany extensive foreign ownership.
Further discussion
We have shown that market structure has a significant role to play in the choice of an appropriate privatisation policy. A limitation of our paper, however, is that we have not allowed for uncertainty. Demougin and Sinn emphasise the risksharing benefits of state participation in the ownership of privatised firms. By excluding this factor we presumably bias our results against state ownership. Also, we make no allowance for the regulatory regime that might be operated after First, we might introduce the assumption that the government could restrict the price at which firms are sold below the competitive level. With unconstrained finance this would be of no benefit, for nothing that happens after the sales stage is affected by the level of P. When finance is constrained, however, restriction of P, for any given s, can increase investment. In fact, as we show in Appendix A, if the government wishes to maximise revenue it should never restrict P in this way. If, however, it wishes to maximise CS (i.e. to maximise i) the solution may be to set P 5 0. In terms of Fig. 2 , the government wants both to raise s as far as possiblē and, for any s, to restrict P such that i is unconstrained. If UIB cuts the s axis at s,t he government should therefore set s 5 minh1, s j, and if s 5 s is the solution here, P 5 0. This conclusion holds for both Case CR and Case CE and is the one situation in our analysis in which the government should give the firm away.
Secondly, we might assume that instead of selling a share in the ownership of firms, the government gives it away to the general population (voucher privatisation). Thus, the government obtains revenue only from selling the remaining share of firms, not from continued ownership. With dispersed ownership, we may assume that the general population does not try and influence firm behaviour. Our analysis could then be reworked, perhaps with Eq. (29) rather then Eq. (2), with three arguments in the welfare function-revenue for the population as a whole, revenue for the government and consumer surplus.
A third modification would be to allow for competition from imports or de novo firms. However, at least on one interpretation, such competition can be treated as being implicitly taken into account already. We may think of our model as being part of a larger model in which goods are differentiated. Suppose that our privatised firms produce goods with one set of characteristics, while imports and the output of de novo firms have other characteristics (see Bennett et al., 1999) . Consider a simple differentiated-good model in which the demand for each type of good depends linearly on the set of prices. Given the prices fixed by importers and de novo firms, our analysis would still hold. If importers or de novo firms reduced their price, however, there would be a vertical fall in the demand curve for the output of the privatised firms. In other words, it would simply cause a reduction in A in Eq. (1). Among the consequences would be that s would rise and so a 0 solution with zero investment in Case CR and no privatisation in Case CE would be more likely to hold.
Finally, consider the implications of imposing the restriction that for privatisation to take place the private ownership share s must be at least 1 / 2. The effect on our solutions is straightforward: whenever the optimum value that we have found for s is less then 1 / 2 it must be raised to 1 / 2. However, this tendency to raise the value of s has significantly different implications, depending on whether the finance constraint binds. If it does not bind, a higher value of s is weakly associated with more investment; but, if the finance constraint does bind, our analysis indicates that the introduction of the restriction s $ 1 / 2 (or any increase in the minimum value of s) is weakly associated with a lower level of investment. Substituting from (17) gives H9(i*) , 0 and so the solution is unique. To show that A 2 c 2 (N 1 1)bQ(i*) . 0, note that with production taking place, there is a positive cost to investment. This implies that marginal revenue must be greater than the marginal unit cost c, or A 2 2bNQ(i*) $ c, from which the proof follows.
Proof of Proposition 3. Along PC all profit p is bid away. Using (2), (3) and (10) Proof of Proposition 4. Differentiating (4) w.r.t. s and using (2), (3), (5), (6) and (10) 3). s 5 s is therefore the optimum s.
1
Turning to Proposition 6, from the first part of this proof, for s . s , dR /ds , 0.
1 2 Differentiating (6) w.r.t. P gives dCS /dP 5 2 bN Q(F 2 P)Q9(F 2 P) , 0. The proof is then the same as for Proposition 6.
Effect on R of Restricting P: For s , s the firm's behaviour is not constrained 1 by a shortage of finance. Any restriction of P below the competitive level reduces R. Suppose that s $ s . In Fig. 2 (i) define loci PC9 2 k, where k is a non-negative 1 constant. It was shown in the proof of Proposition 5 that, for s $ s , R is greater as 1 we move to the left on PC9. Along any locus PC9 2 k the same property applies, so R is greatest at the intersection of the locus with UIB. We have shown in Proposition 5 that along UIB for s $ s , R is maximized at s 5 s . But at s 5 s , 1 1 1 the firm is on PC9, so there is no restriction of P. This applies for both Case CR and Case CE
